Western New England Law Review
Volume 6 6 (1983-1984)
Issue 1

Article 1

1-1-1983

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERPRETATIONS OF STATUTES
Claude T. Coffman

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Claude T. Coffman, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF STATUTES, 6 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 1
(1983), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol6/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

Volume 6
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1983

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND
LAW REVIEW

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERPRETATIONS OF STATUTES
CLAUDE

I.

T.

COFFMAN*

INTRODUCTION

When a court has before it a question of statutory interpreta
tion, what difference does it make, or should it make, that the provi
sion has previously been construed by an administrative agency?
The court, we know, has the final say, but should it give weight to
the administrative interpretation, even though that interpretation
may not be the one which the court itself would have placed on the
statute (a limited scope of review)? Or should an independent judg
ment be reached by the court as to its meaning? Put in a different
way, is the court's function to decide how, as an original proposition,
it would construe the statute, or should the court go no further than
determining whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable? The
field is one of great uncertainty in which equally impressive cases
may be found to cite in favor of deferring to the determination of the
administrator or giving it no weight whatever.
Where they have given weight to the agency's determination,
courts have used a variety of expressions to describe how much
weight: the agency's determination is to be accepted if it has" 'war
rant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law"; I the proper scope
• Professor of Law, Memphis State University, Cecil C. Humphreys School of
Law. B.A., University of Mississippi, 1938; L.L.B., University of Mississippi School of
Law, 1938. Deputy General Counsel, United States Department of Agriculture, 1968-74.
The author wishes to record his indebtedness to the staff of WESTERN NEW ENG
LAND LAW REVIEW for its careful and courteous editing of this manuscript.
I. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. Ill, 131 (1944).
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is one of "rational basis";2 "serious deference" must be given to the
administrator's determination;3 the agency's interpretation is "enti
tled to respect";4 the agency's definition should be affirmed "if that
definition does not appear too farfetched";5 constructions of statutes
by those charged with the administration of the statute must be sus
tained "unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the . . .
statutes."6 Whatever the expression used, the essential meaning is
that the administrator's interpretation will be upheld if it is
"reasonable."7
The federal Administrative Procedure ActS provides that: "To
the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitu
tional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning and ap
plicability of the terms of an agency action."9
While it is clear that the ultimate decision on the interpretation
of a statute belongs to the judiciary, the legislative prescriptions of
procedure shed no light upon whether the court, in making its deter
mination, should give weight to the agency's prior construction of
the provision. For the answer to that question, one must resort to the
court decisions.
II.

SOME PROPOSED ANSWERS

Let us begin with Judge Friendly's observation in a recent case:
We think it is time to recognize, in line with Professor Ken
neth Culp Davis' brilliant discussion. . . that there are two lines
of Supreme Court decisions on this subject which are analytically
in conflict. with the result that a Court of Appeals must choose the
2. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1934).
3. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 484 (1979).
4. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
5. NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U.S. 264, 269 (1956).
6. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 750 (1969) (quoting with approval Commis
sioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948».
7. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Stewart put it this way in Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968):
The construction put on a statute by the agency charged with administering it is
entitled to deference by the courts, and ordinarily that construction will be af
firmed if it has a "reasonable basis in law." ... But the courts are the final
authorities on issues of statutory construction. . . and "are not obliged to stand
aside and rubberstamp their affirmance of administrative decisions that they
deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional
policy underlying a statute."
8. 5 U.S.c. §§ 551-706 (1982).
9. Id. § 706.
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one it deems more appropriate for the case at hand. 10

Not only are there two conflicting lines of decision - one line
deferring to the determination of the administrator, II the other
reaching an independent judgment l2 - but the Court has also given
no consistent rationale as to why it sometimes uses one approach and
sometimes the other.13 This situation has provided commentators
with an opportunity for extensive debate on the subject resulting in a
number of suggested theories from which one may plausibly
choose. 14
The conventional approach in determining the scope of review
has been to attempt to distinguish between findings of fact and con
clusions of law. 15 Questions of law are to be determined by the
court, while determinations of facts, if supported by substantial evi
10. Pittson Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976) (re
ferring to 4 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 30.01-.09 (1958 & Supp. 1970».
II. Some of the leading cases supporting the view that deference must be given to
the decisions of an administrative agency are NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322
U.S. III (1944); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. U.S., 307
U.S. 125 (1939).
12. Among the cases sanctioning the exercise of independent judgment by the
court are Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970);
NLRB v. Highland Park Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330
U.S. 485 (1947).
13. In some cases, for example, the Court has explained its independent approach
on the ground that the issue was a question of law. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159
(1970); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
Yet in cases like O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951), and
Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106 (1904), where the question was recognized to
be largely one of law, the Court did not take an independent approach.
In Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 322 U.S. 607 (1944), the Court explained its
independent approach on the ground that the administrative agency used the wrong
"factor" in making its decision.
Occasionally, the question of independent approach vis-a-vis a deferential approach
has been said to tum on whether the agency interpretation is "consistent with the Con
gressional purpose." Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
Some cases justify taking a deferential approach either on the ground that the issue
is a question of fact, Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939), or that it
belonged to the "usual administrative routine," Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941), or
that the decision calls for administrative expertise, National Muffler Dealers Ass'n., Inc.
v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979); NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U.S. 264,
269 (1956).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 38-50.
15. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATiVE LAW TREATISE § 30.08 (1958); GELLHORN,
BYSE & STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 251 (7th ed. 1979); L.
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 546 (1965). The Administrative
Procedure Act provides that "the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of
law." 5 U.S.C § 706 (1982).
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dence, are appropriately left to the administrative agency.16 But
Professor Dickinson long ago pointed out the weakness of relying
upon this distinction. As he says:
In truth, the distinction between "questions of law" and "ques
tions of fact" really gives little help in determining how far the
courts will review; and for the good reason that there is no fixed
distinction. They are not two mutually exclusive kinds of ques
tions, based upon a difference of subject-matter. Matters of law
grow downward into roots of fact, and matters of fact reach up
ward, without a break, into matters of law. . . . It would seem
that when the courts are unwilling to review, they are tempted to
explain by the easy device of calling the question one of "fact";
and when otherwise disposed, they say that it is a question of
"law." 17

Professor Dickinson's observations are aptly demonstrated by Roch
ester Telephone Corp. v. United States .18 There the issue was whether
one corporation was "controlled" by another. The Court stated:
"This is an issue of fact to be determined by the special circum
stances of each case."19 In a similar vein is O'Leary v. Brown-Pac!ftc
Maxon, Inc. 20 which arose under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' ACt. 21 That act authorizes payment for accidental injury or
death "arising out of and in the course of employment."22 The ques
tion was whether a drowning, which occurred during. a rescue at
tempt in a channel near a recreational center maintained by the
employer, "arose out of and in the course of [the employee's] em
ployment."23 Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
The Deputy Commissioner treated the question whether the
particular rescue attempt described by the evidence was one of the
class covered by the Act as a question of "fact." Doing so only
serves to illustrate once more the variety of ascertainments cov
ered by the blanket term "fact." Here of course it does not con
note a simple, external, physical event as to which there is
conflicting testimony. The conclusion concerns a combination of
happenings and the inferences drawn from them. In part at least
16.
17.
UNITED
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See supra notes 13 & 15.
J. DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE
STATES 55 (1927) (emphasis in original).
307 U.S. 125 (1939).
Id. at 145 (followed in Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick, 353 U.S. 151, 169 (1957».
340 U.S. 504 (1951).
33 U.S.C. § 901 (1976).
Id § 902(2).
O'Leary, 340 U.S. at 506.
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the inferences presuppose applicable standards for assessing the
simple, external facts. Yet the standards are not so severable from
the experience of industry nor of such a nature as to be peculiarly
appropriate for independent judicial ascertainment as "questions
of law."24

In contrast with the two previous decisions is a case arising
under the National Labor Relations Act. 25 Section 10 of that Act
empowers the National Labor Relations Board, when it finds that
an unfair labor practice exists, to "take such affirmative action in
cluding reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will
effectuate the policies" of the Act. 26 The term "employee" was de
fined to include "any individual whose work has ceased as a conse
quence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or
because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any
other regular and substantially equivalent employment. . . ."27 The
Court reversed the Board's order to reinstate employees who had
engaged in a "sit-down" strike, saying, by way of explanation: "We
are unable to conclude that Congress intended to compel employers
to retain persons in their employ regardless of their unlawful con
duct, - to invest those who go on strike with an immunity from
discharge for acts of trespass or violence against the employer's
property, which they would not have enjoyed had they remained at
work."28 Here, the Court treated the issue of whether the term "em
ployee" applied to such persons as a legal question.
Similarly, in a more recent case,29 a statute permitted participat
ing farmers to assign their payments only as security for cash or ad
vances to finance "making a crop."30 The Secretary of Agriculture
had issued regulations permitting assignments to secure the payment
of cash rent for land used in farming. 31 When the regulations were
challenged in court, Mr. Justice Douglas stated that the statute, au
thorizing the Secretary to promulgate such regulations "as he may
deem proper," did not commit the task of defining "making a crop"
entirely to the discretionary judgment of the Secretary. "On the con
trary," according to Douglas, "since the only or principal dispute
24. Id at 507-08.
25. 29 U.S.c. §§ 151-69 (1976).
26. Id. § 160(c).
27. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.c. § 152(3) (1976».
28. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurigical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255 (1939).
29. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
30. Act of Nov. 3, 1965, Pub. L. 89-321, 79 Stat. 1187 (1965).
31. 31 Fed. Reg. 2815 (1966) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 709 (1983».
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relates to the meaning of the statutory term, the controversy must
ultimately be resolved, not on the basis of matters within the special
competence of the Secretary, but by judicial application of canons of
statutory construction."32
Is the question one of law, or is it a question of fact, when, for
example, as in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc. ,33 the statute uses
the term "employee" and the issue is whether newsboys are covered
by that term. 34 When examined from one angle, it appears to be a
determination of fact as to whether newsboys are employees; from
the other angle it appears to be a question of law-whether "em
ployee" covers newsboys.
The question is an old one. Holmes and Thayer debated the
issue in describing the function of the jury in negligence cases. 35
Thayer viewed the jury function as simply drawing further infer
ences from the facts at hand, "namely, the behavior, in a supposed
case, of the prudent man."36 Holmes, on the other hand, thought
each case involved the determination of a "standard of conduct" and
that even though this was left to the jury it was in reality a conclu
sion of law. 37
The process that goes by the name of "interpretation," Pound
has suggested, actually encompasses two separate steps: (1) deter
mining the meaning of the statute as it was framed and with respect
to its intended scope; and (2) applying to the facts at hand the provi
sion so interpreted. 38 Professor Brown would utilize this line of de
marcation in partitioning authority between court and agency:
[T]he interpretation or definition of [a statute] is a matter of "law"
properly for courts. On the other hand, when the law is capable of
no further definition, the question whether the facts of the particu
lar case meet the legal norm is a matter of fact and for the fact
finding agency. 39
32.
33.

Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1970).
322 U.S. III (1944).
34. Id. at 113.
35. J.B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
(1898); O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881).
36. See THAYER, supra note 35, at 228.
37. See HOLMES, supra note 35, at 126.
38. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 106-09 (1922).
39. Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 HARV. L. REV. 899, 904 (1943).
See also DICKINSON, supra note 17, at 313-14. The distinction lies "between the task of
establishing a definition, and that of saying whether or not particular facts correspond
with it. The former is the question for the court, the latter is for the fact-finding body."
Professor Schotland expresses a similar notion: The "general construction of a statute
wholly independently of the particular controversy at bar" is for the courts, while apply
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To attempt to determine the meaning of the statute independently of
the facts at hand would be unrealistic. To the extent that a statute
has meaning independently of the facts, that meaning will generally
be evident and need no interpretation.40 In most cases, an issue of
interpretation arises only because there is a question as to whether
the statutory provision is applicable to the facts presented.
Nearer to the truth is the description of the decisional process as
(1) the finding of the existence of facts of a "basic" or underlying
nature; (2) from these basic facts, finding the ultimate facts according
to the language of the statute; and (3) from this finding the decision
will follow by the application of the statutory criterion. 41 Consider
the example of the question in the Hearst case,42 whether newsboys
were "employees" within the meaning of the National Labor Rela
tions Act. The NLRB found that the newsboys were in charge of
streetcomer stands. Hearst assigned the street comers, allocated the
newspapers among the newsboys, and fixed the price at which the
newsboys were to sell the papers to the public. Hearst also pre
scribed the hours of work and imposed certain sanctions on the tardy
and the delinquent. 43 All of these findings were certainly findings of
fact. But there remained the question whether, assuming the facts to
be true, the newsboys were "employees." It is this final step in the
decisional process that causes doubt and confusion. "Finding so
called ultimate 'facts,' " said Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "more clearly
implies the application of standards of law."44
Professor Byse advances the suggestion that the proper scope for
the reviewing court is to decide independently whether the agency
was entitled, in making its decision, (I) to consider a particular fac
tor; or (2) to give a particular factor controlling weight; or (3) to
refuse to consider a possibly relevant factor. 45 This is necessary, he
reasons, to determine whether the administrator's action is consistent
with the particular statute and the congressional purpose. If the fur
ing a statute so interpreted to the particular facts at bar is mainly for the agency. Schot
land, Scope ofReview o.fAdministrative Action-Remarks Before the D. C Circuit Judicial
Conference, March 18, 1974, 34 FED. B.l. 54, 58 (1975).
40. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see the author's article, Coffman, Essay on
Statutory Interpretation, 9 MEM. ST. V.L. REV. 57 (1978).
41. Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d. 554, 559 (D.C. Cir.) cerl. denied,
305 U.S. 613 (1938).
42. 322 U.S. III (1944).
43. Id. at 116-19.
44. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944).
45. Byse, The Availability and Scope o.f Judicial Review ofAdministrative Action by
Ordinary Courts, LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOG
ICAL REVOLUTION 543, 559-65 (1. Hazard & w. Wagner, eds., 1974).
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ther step of applying the factors to the facts presented is necessary
for the agency to reach a determination, the scope of review as to the
agency's determination in that instance is limited. 46
To Professor Jaffe, the controlling principle is that when the
judges are convinced that a certain reading, or application, of the
statute is the correct-or the only faithful-reading or application,
they should intervene and so declare. 47 Where the result of their
study leaves them without a definite preference, they can and often
should abstain from interfering if the agency's preference is
"reasonable."48
Still others have suggested that expertise-the comparative
qualifications of agency and court in resolving the issue-should be
the guide. 49
Professor Davis concludes that the court's choice between sub
stituting its judgment for that of the agency's and using the reasona
bleness test is not guided by any explicit theory but depends upon
judicial discretion. 50
N one of these approaches affords a very satisfactory guide on
which administrators or lower courts may rely in construing statu
tory language. Hence this search for a better framework of analysis.
III.

A DIFFERENT ANALYSIS

Before proceeding to a discussion of a different framework for
analysis, a preliminary observation should be made. It is clear that a
court will determine independently (1) the meaning of a statute
which applies to more than one agency;51 (2) whether a given statute
should be given retroactive effect;52 or (3) which of two inconsistent
statutes applies to the facts presented. 53 The reasons for this are
clear. In the case of a statute that is applicable to more than one
46. Id. at 565-67.
47. L. JAFFE, supra note 15, at 572 (1965).
48. Id.
49. NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg., 341 U.S. 322, 326-28 (l951)(Frankfurter, J., and
Douglas, J., dissenting); See also J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 145-49
( 1938).
50. K. DAVIS, supra note 15, at § 30.08 (1958); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF
THE SEVENTIES § 30.00 (1976).
51. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) (Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.c. § 552 (1982»; General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c. § 2000a through h-6 (Supp. V 1981); Tennessee Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531-43 (1982».
52. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); United States v. Lindsay,
346 U.S. 568 (1954).
53. Although no case has been found on the point, independent determination of
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agency, a court must give an interpretation that applies to all. Even if
there were not conflicting views between agencies, it would be inap
propriate to have the interpretation depend upon the agency whose
decision, encompassing the issue, reached a court. In the case of a
question as to whether a statute should be given retroactive effect, or
as to which of two inconsistent statutes applies to a given set of facts,
the issues are of a kind that make them peculiarly appropriate for
judges to decide. That still leaves, however, the question which is
most commonly encountered, namely, what are or should be the re
spective roles for the court and for the agency charged with the ad
ministration of an act in determining whether a statutory term
applies to a given set of facts?
We might ask ourselves the question: Why do we insist upon
judicial review of administrative actions in the first place? Our de
sire to have courts review administrative actions arises from the his
toric principle of the "supremacy of law" or " rule of law" as it is
called. We want an independent assessment by the court to see that
the agency has stayed within the bounds authorized by the legisla
ture. This is the controlling principle to which the court should have
regard when it reviews agency action. While it may be asserted that
the "correct" interpretation of every word in a statute is necessary
for the exercise of power by the administrative agency, the interpre
tation of certain provisions may be regarded as having special signif
icance in determining whether the agency is acting outside its
delegated power. The thesis put forward here is that the question
ought not to be viewed as simply a matter of determining the mean
ing of the prescribed text to be arrived at by a given legal technique
and therefore one which courts are uniquely qualified to decide. In
stead, the question should be answered in terms of whether the par
ticular issue is one which has been delegated to the agency for
decision, or whether it is one which will determine the extent of the
agency's delegation. If the former, the court should leave the
agency's determination undisturbed if it is a reasonable construction,
in order not to stifle effective development of policy. If the latter, the
court should make an independent evaluation in order to ensure that
the agency does not stray from its delegated power.
To ensure that the agency stays within its mandate, agency in
terpretations should be independently assessed when the limit of its
discretion under the statute or any subordinate provision is at issue.
this type of interpretive issue would appear to be equally as clear as it is in the other two
types of interpretive issues mentioned.

10
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Where, however, the statutory term involves an issue within the
agency's discretion, its interpretation, if reasonable, should not be
overridden.
In cases involving questions of statutory construction falling
within an agency's discretion, the requirement that the "correctness"
of every interpretation be subject to an independent determination
by the court would cost more than we would gain. First, it would, to
some significant degree, cause a diminution of administrative energy
by taking from its hands responsibility for the decision. Who, from
within the administrative process, has not heard an administrator
say, "Well, if he is entitled to a court decision on this, there is no
point in my taking any more time on it," and then proceed to a de
termination without the same thorough consideration of the claim
ant's position that he would otherwise give to it? "Responsibility,"
said Mr. Justice Brandeis, "is the great developer of men."54
At the same time, however, the interest of the judiciary is to
avoid the accusation of being a rubber stamp for administrative in
terpretations. But courts need not go so far as to develop an interpre
tation of their own; it should suffice to determine that the agency's
interpretation is reasonable.
It is sometimes argued that the courts must independently as
sign a meaning to the statute, for if the agency's interpretation is not
"correct," the agency is acting illegally. This falsely assumes that
words have one meaning and no other. We must recognize that the
interpretation of statutes, as Mr. Justice Holmes has stated, involves
not just "taking the words and a dictionary" in order to determine
their meanings. 55 Nor do the types of issues of interpretation con
fronted in this area often present questions "of an essentially legal
nature in the sense that legal education and lawyers' learning afford
peculiar competence for their adjustment."56 Rather, the appropri
ate construction of a statute may be a matter of policy - a matter
Congress chose to delegate to an administrative body, not the courts.
IV.

COURT CASES

The basis on which this notion proceeds first emerged in ICC v.
United States ex reI Humbolt Steamship Company, 57 an early case
54. St. Joseph Stock Yards v. United States, 298 U.S. 38,92 (1936).
55. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914).
56. Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104, 122 (l939)(Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
57. 224 U.S. 474 (1912).
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under the Interstate Commerce Act. 58 That Act gave the Interstate
Commerce Commission jurisdiction over carriers operating "from
one State or Territory,. . . to any other State or Territory . . . or
from one place to another place in the same Territory."59 A steam
ship company petitioned the Commission alleging that the White
Pass and Yukon Railway Company, operating in Alaska, violated
the Act. The Commission, however, construed the word "territory"
to include only so-called "organized territories" such as New Mexico
or Arizona were at that time. 60 The steamship company instituted an
action to require the Commission to take jurisdiction and to grant
the relief which the steamship company requested. 61 The Commis
sion argued that the court was bound by the Commission's interpre
tation and that the question of jurisdiction which the Commission
had decided was as much within the scope of its authority as any
other question of interpretation. 62
The Commission's argument was based upon statements made
by the Supreme Court in an earlier case,63 where the Court was re
ferring to a proceeding before the Commission in which the railroad
carrier was the owner of extensive coal fields and had sold the coal to
be delivered for a fixed sum per ton for both the coal and the trans
portation. 64 In that case, New York, New Haven & Hariford Railroad
Company v. ICC,65 argument was made to the Commission that such
a fixed sum was insufficient to pay for both the cost of mining the
coal and the rate of transportation the railroad charged private ship
pers, and therefore amounted to an "undue or unreasonable prefer
ence or advantage" contrary to section 3 of the Interstate Commerce
Act. 66 The Commission held otherwise, stating that the vendor-car
rier had a legal right to charge any loss that may have occurred to its
account as vendor, rather than to its account as a carrier, and there
fore the transaction could not be found to be a discrimination be
tween the freight rate it charged itself and the rate it charged other
58.

Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.c.

§ 10101-11917 (Supp. v 1981».
59. Id. § 1, 34 Stat. 584 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 10501(a)(2) (Supp.

v

1981».
60. Humbolt S.s., 224 U.S. at 479-80.
61. Id. at 477-78.
62. Id. at 476.
63. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. v. ICC, 200 U.S. 361 (1906).
64. Id. at 382.
65. 200 U.S. 361 (1906).
66. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, § 3, 24 Stat. 379, 380 (current version at 49 U.S.c.
§ 10741(b)-(d) (Supp. V 1981».
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shippers. 67 The Court stated that such an interpretation given by the
Commission would be binding on the Court, invoking "the repeated
declarations of the court that an exertion of power by the Commis
sion concerning such matters was entitled to great weight and was
not lightly to be interfered with."68
In Humbolt Steamship, however, the Court, without so much as
addressing the question whether any weight should be given the
Commission's interpretation, stated categorically that Alaska was
one of the Territories of the United States and ordered the Commis
sion to take jurisdiction of the cause and proceed to the merits of the
controversy.69
Why did the Court act in this independent fashion to apply the
term "territory" to Alaska? Why was there no discussion of the
Commission's first-line responsibility for interpreting the statute? If
we can accurately discern the reason why the Court treated this issue
in Humbolt Steamship differently from the way it treated the issue in
New Haven Rai/road,70 we may have the answer to the question as to
how those cases in which the Court exercised a limited review of an
agency's interpretation of a statute71 may be distinguished from
those cases in which it performed an independent evaluation. 72
The guiding principle seems to be that where a particular inter
pretation involves an issue as to whether the agency acted within the
scope of its authority, the Court has ordinarily faced and resolved
that type of issue in a substantially independent manner. 73 When
the agency's scope of authority has been resolved, interpretations of
statutory issues within the agency's area of discretion, if reasonable,
have been favorably decided in the agency's behalf.
Thus, when the question again arose whether certain practices
engaged in by a carrier constituted an "undue or unreasonable pref
erence," the Court reaffirmed the view that the determination of that
67.
(1890).
68.
69.

Haddock v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Ry. Co., 3 I.C.c. Rep. 302

200 U.S. at 402.
224 U.S. at 481.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
71. See supra note II.
72. See supra note 12.
73. See Red Ball Motor Freight v. Shannon, 377 U.S. 311 (1964) (whether the ICC
had jurisdiction over dealers in livestock and commodities who backhauled sugar in their
trucks under an exception for persons transporting property in furtherance of a primary
business enterprise (other than transportation) of such persons); Office Employees Int'l
Union v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957) (labor union held to be "employer" of its own
workers and therefore within the jurisdiction of NLRB).
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question fell to the agency's administrative discretion. In that case,
United States v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company,74 the issue
was whether the railroad, by granting certain grain reshipping privi
leges at Nashville while refusing such privileges at Atlanta, had vio
lated the prohibition against "undue or unreasonable preferences."75
The lower court thought that since the facts were undisputed, the
question was one of law which it should decide independently.76
The Supreme Court reversed, however, saying:
It is not disputable that from the beginning the very purpose for
which the Commission was created was to bring into existence a
body which from its peculiar character would be most fitted to
primarily decide whether from facts, disputed or undisputed, in a
given case preference or discrimination existed. . . . Ifthe view of
the statute upheld below be sustained, the Commission would be
come but a mere instrument for the purpose of taking testimony to
be submitted to the courts for their ultimate actionP

When this analysis is applied to a recent case arising under a
program for the assistance oflndians,78 the parameters within which
deference should be accorded an agency is clear. Ramon Ruiz and
his wife were Papago Indians who left the Papago Reservation in
Arizona to seek employment fifteen miles away at the Phelps-Dodge
Copper mines. Although the Ruizes had lived away from the reser
vation continuously since 1940, they had not been assimilated into
the dominant culture apart from employment and maintained their
ties with the reservation. They were denied general assistance bene
fits by the Bureau of Indian Affairs on the ground that eligibility
was limited to Indians living "on reservations."79
The Snyder Act SO provided that the Bureau of Indian Affairs
should expend such moneys as Congress might deem appropriate for
the assistance of "Indians throughout the United States."81 The an
nual appropriation Acts authorized assistance to "needy Indians."82
The formal budget request submitted to Congress, the eligibility re
quirements in the administrative manual, as well as testimony before
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
Related

235 U.S. 314 (1914).
Id. at 318-20.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 320-321 (citation omitted).
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
Id. at 204.
25 U.S.c. § 13 (1976 & Supp. V 1981.)
Id.
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 207 (1974)(citing Department of Interior and
Agencies Appropriation Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-28, 81 Stat. 59, 60 (1967).
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successive appropriations subcommittees had all been to the effect
that assistance of this kind was limited to Indians "on reserva
tions."83 On the basis of this legislative material, the Secretary of
Interior took the view that Congress did not intend 84 assistance be
given to Indians in the position of the Ruizes. 85 Mr. Justice Black
mun, writing for a unanimous Court, agreed that there was "some
force" in the Secretary's argument but said the Court's examination
of this and other materials "leads us to a conclusion contrary to that
urged by the Secretary."86 Speaking specifically to the question of
whether weight should be given to an agency interpretation, Mr. Jus
tice Blackmun stated that for deference to be granted, it must be
consistent with the Congressional purpose, and that in this case it
was "evident" to the Court that Congress did not itself intend to
limit its authorization to only those Indians directly on, in contrast to
those "near," the reservation and that therefore the Bureau of Indian
Affair's interpretation must fail.8 7 Authority to determine assistance
eligibility of individual Indians rested with the administrative
agency. Whether the agency had discretion to exclude Indians not
on reservations, however, involved a question of the extent of the
agency's delegated authority and was therefore appropriate for in
dependent evaluation by the Court.
No pair of cases illustrates this principle better than two well
known decisions, often contrasted with each other,88 NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc. 89 and Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB.90In both
cases, the employers were subject to the National Labor Relations
Act's requirement that an employer bargain collectively with the
chosen representatives of his employees. 91 The term "employee"
was not defined by the statute. 92 In the Hearst case, the employer
had refused to bargain collectively with its so-called "newsboys" on
the ground that they were not employees but independent contrac
Id at 210-12.
Id at 210.
85. Id at 211.
86. Id at 212.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, supra note 15, at § 30.06; L. JAFFE, supra note 15, at 558-61.
89. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
90. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
91. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.c. § 158(a)(5) (1976».
92. Congress provided a more complete definition of "employee" in the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 137-38 (1947) (amending the
National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.c. § 152(3) (1976».
83.
84.
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tors.93 The NLRB, after making the specific findings of fact outlined
earlier,94 decided that the newsboys were employees and ordered
Hearst to bargain with them. 95 The Supreme Court, reversing the
Circuit Court of Appeals, upheld the Board's determination, stating:
Undoubtedly questions of statutory interpretation, especially
when arising in the first instance in judicial proceedings, are for
the courts to resolve. . . . But where the question is one of specific
application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the
agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the
reviewing court's function is limited. 96

The Board's determination is to be accepted, the court said, if it has
" 'warrant in the record' " and "a reasonable basis in law."97
In Packard, the question concerned the right of foremen to bar
gain collectively98 under the same act. 99 The company employed
about 32,000 rank-and-file workmen and approximately 1,100 "fore
men."loo As a group, the foremen were stated to be highly paid and,
unlike the workmen, were paid for justifiable absences and holi
days.101 The company contended the "foremen" were not "employ
ees" under the Act and thus the company was under no duty to
bargain. 102 In 1942, the Board held that foremen were statutory em
93. 322 U.S. at 113, 119-20.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
9S. 322 U.S. at 114.
96. Id. at 130-31.
97. Id at 131. The statute was later amended to exclude independent contractors.
Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 137-38 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.c. § IS2(3) (1976».
The approach in the Hearst case followed in the path of the earlier case of Gray v.
Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941), which arose under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, ch. 127,
SO Stat. 72 (1937). That act authorized the Bituminous Coal Division of the Department
of Interior to fix minimum prices to be paid for coal but exempted from its provisions
coal "consumed by the producer." Id. at 83. The Seaboard Airline Railroad entered into
leases with certain owners and contracted with independent contractors to mine the coal
with machinery which they leased from the mine owners. The railway filed an applica
tion for exemption but was turned down by the Commission as not being the "producer"
of the coal it consumed and therefore not entitled to the exemption. Gray, 314 U.S. at
403. The Supreme Court upheld the Commission saying: "Such a determination as is
here involved belongs to the usual administrative routine. . . . Where, as here, a deter
mination has been left to an administrative body, this delegation will be respected and
the administrative conclusion left untouched." Id. at 411-12.
98. 330 U.S. at 486.
99. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 8(a)(5), 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935) (codi
fied as amended at 29 U.S.c. § IS8(a)(S) (1976».
100. 330 U.S. at 487.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 488
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ployees. 103 One year later, in Maryland Drydock Company,l04 the
Board reversed its earlier position and held that foremen were not
statutory employees. 105 Thereafter, in Packard Motor Car Com
pany,l06 the Board returned to its original position. 107 The Court, in
a five-to-four decision, affirmed the last determination of the Board,
but not by the same approach it had used in Hearst .108 Writing for
the majority, Mr. Justice Jackson stated: "The question presented by
this case is whether foremen are entitled as a class to the rights of
self-organization, collective bargaining, and other concerted activi
ties. . . ."109 The Court held that they were, stating: "[I]t is for Con
gress, not for us, to create exceptions or qualifications at odds with
[the statute's] plain terms." 110
In both Packard and Hearst, the Board construed the same stat
utory term. In Hearst, where the question was whether newsboys
were "employees," the Court stated that it must accept the Board's
determination if it has" 'warrant in the record' " and "a reasonable
basis in law."lll In Packard, where the issue was whether foremen
were "employees," the Court, although it affirmed the Board's deci
sion, did so on the basis of an independent interpretation of the stat
ute. The four dissenting justices also made a categorical
determination that foremen were not and could not be "employees"
under the Act. I 12 Because their unionization may create conflict of
interest on matters of labor relations, the question of whether super
visory employees, as a general matter, are protected by the Labor
Act is a determination necessary to establish an important point of
reference from which the Board's discretion may be determined. If
the underlying premise of this discussion is correct, this is the very
type of issue on which we desire an independent evaluation by the
Court. When, on the other hand, the same word "employee" is read
in the context of an issue on the periphery of the area of concern 
whether it covers specific newsboys- a determination one way or
the other does not have the same significance in seeing that the
agency stays within its mandate.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
III.
112.

Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961,969 (1942).
49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943).
Id. at 741-42.
61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945).
Id. at 26.
See supra text accompanying note 96.
330 U.S. at 486.
Id at 490.
322 U.S at 131.
330 U.S. at 500 (Douglas, Burton, Frankfurter, J.J., and Vinson, c.J.).
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The foregoing analysis of Hearst and Packard is reflected in the
Court's decision in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Company,J13 where the
question arose whether the company had a duty to bargain with cer
tain buyers. The Board determined that the buyers were statutory
"employees" and thus found that the company violated the NLRA
by refusing to bargain. 1 14 The Court overrode the determination of
113. 416 U.S. 267 (1974). The disparate treatment of the Board's determinations in
Packard and Hearst closely track an earlier pair of cases under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). In
South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251 (1940), the widow of an individ

ual employee had been awarded compensation for her husband's drowning. Her hus
band's employer owned a lighter on navigable waters of the United States. The
decedent's chief task was facilitating the flow of coal from his boat to the vessel being
fueled - removing obstruction to the flow with a stick. He performed such additional
tasks as throwing the ship's rope in releasing or making the boat fast. He performed no
navigation duties but occasionally performed some cleaning duties on the boat. He did
not work while the boat was en route from the dock to the vessel to be fueled. The
deputy commissioner, in awarding the compensation to be paid by the employer to the
widow, held that the decedent was not "a member of a crew." After examining the legis
lative history of the exception, the Court concluded that the exception was enacted for
the distinct aim of exempting seamen. Seamen, the Court found, preferred to remain
outside the coverage of the act, thus retaining the presumed advantages of common law
remedies. The Court therefore affirmed the determination of the deputy commissioner.
The question, said the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, was not a question
of law. "The word 'crew' does not have an absolutely unvarying legal significance." Id.
at 258. Each case turns on questions of fact, and authority to determine such questions
has been conferred by Congress to the deputy commissioner. Id. at 257-58.
But in Norton v. Warner, 321 U.S. 565 (1944), the Court took an altogether different
approach. Though the statute was the same, the facts were different. This case con
cerned a worker on a barge which had no mode of power of its own. The worker was a
seaman. The deputy commissioner determined the barge was not a vessel and the worker
not a "member of a crew," and therefore held him covered by the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The Court, however, showed no deference toward
the administrative view in this case, and held that the barge was a vessel and the worker
"a member of the crew." The Court recalled as it had noted in the South Chicago case
the reason for the exemption:
The maritime unions appearing in the present case [as amici curiae) maintain
that those remedies [at admiralty) are indeed superior to the relief afforded by
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act. Whether they are more desira
ble than a system of compensation is not for us to determine. But where Con
gress has provided that those basic rights shall not be withheld from a class of
or classes of maritime employees it is our duty on judicial review to respect the
command and not permit the exemption to be narrowed whether by adminis
trative construction or otherwise.
NOr/on, 321 U.S. at 571.
The statute, the word, and the agency involved were all the same. How then to
explain the difference except that, read in the context of the latter case, the issue was
significant in establishing the limits of the exemption? Once the contours of the excep
tion were established, the agency was free to make a choice as in the coal supply boat
case.
114. 416 U.S. at 270-71.
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the Board, and held that all "managerial employees" were excluded
from the Act, but then deferred to the Board's decision whether these
buyers were within the category of managerial employees. I 15 Once
again, the Court allowed the Board's determination within its discre
tion to stand, once the reach of its discretion had been determined.
Another set of cases which may serve to illustrate significantly
the rationale suggested herein is NLRB v. Highland Park Manufac
turing Co. 116 and NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling CO."7 The Taft
Hartley Act" 8 provided that a labor organization could not be certi
fied by the Board as a collective bargaining agent unless each officer
of the labor organization and the "officers" of any "national or inter
national labor organization" of which it was an affiliate or constitu
ent unit, certified they were not members of the Communist Party. 119
In Highland Park, the officers of the Textile Workers Union did so
certify but the officers of the CIa, with which the Textile Union was
affiliated, did not. The employer refused to bargain with the union.
The Board held that the CIO was not a "national or international
labor organization" within the meaning of the statute since it was
regarded in labor circles as a federation rather than a national or
international union. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in the case,
maintained that "[t]he best source for us in determining whether a
term used in the field of industrial relations has a technical connota
tion is the body to which Congress has committed the administration
of the statute., Certainly if there is no reasonable ground for re
jecting the determination of the National Labor Relations Board, its
view should not be rejected."120 Mr. Justice Douglas cited Hearst in
his dissent and stated,
I see no answer to the analysis of Mr. Justice Frankfurter if
objectivity is our standard and if the expertise of administrative
agencies is to continue as our guide. In situations no more diffi
cult than this we have taken the administrative construction of
statutory words. Until today the test has not been whether the
construction would be our own if we sat as the Board, but whether
it has a reasonable basis in custom, practice, or legislative
liS. Id. at 289-90.
116. 341 U.S. 322 (1951).
117. 350 U.S. 264 (1956).
118. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120,61 Stat. 136 (1947).
119. Section 101,61 Stat. 146 (1947) (amending National Labor Relations Act, ch.
372, § 9, 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935», relevant language repealed by Act of Sept. 14, 1959,
Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 201(d), 73 Stat. 519, 524 (1959).
120. 341 U.S. at 327 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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history. 121
But the majority reversed the Board, holding, in an independent ap
proach, that not to apply the requirement to the very top levels of
influence and actual power in the labor movement in this country
would be contrary to the "basic purpose" of the provision which was
to "wholly eradicate and bar" members of the Communist party
from leadership in the American labor movement "at each and every
level."122 Plainly, a majority of the justices believed that the discre
tion in the Board was not broad enough to determine whether the
CIO was exempt from the requirement.
Yet, notwithstanding the purpose to "wholly eradicate and bar"
members of the Communist party from leadership in the American
labor movement at each and every level, the Court, in Coca-Cola,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter this time writing for the majority, let stand
the Board's determination that the word "officer" in the same provi
sion included only those persons who occupied a position identified
as an office in a union's constitution. 123 In the proceeding before the
Board in that case, the employer offered to prove that the Regional
Director of the CIO for Kentucky, who admittedly had not filed a
non-Communist affidavit, was an "officer" within the meaning of the
statute. The Board rejected this contention on the ground that he
was not a person occupying a position identified as an office in the
union's constitution. The Court upheld the Board's determination.
On one hand, said Mr. Justice Frankfurter, if the word is to be
viewed in its ordinary meaning, "officer" normally means those who
hold defined offices, and not "the boys in the backroom" whether in
politics or in the trade-union movement. 124 Citing Hearst, he stated:
But if the word be deemed to have·a peculiar connotation for
those intimate with trade union affairs, . . . then of course the
Board's expertness comes into play. We should affirm its defini
tion if that definition does not appear too farfetched. 125
Clearly the Court thought there was a sufficient delegation of au
thority to enable the Board to make the determination as to which
officers must take the oath.
In all of these cases an observable pattern can be identified: the
agency is permitted to make those statutory interpretations which the
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id at 327-28 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id at 325.
Coca-Cola Bot/ling, 350 U.S. at 269.
Id.
Id.
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Court perceives Congress left to the discretion of the agency, but the
determination of the extent of the authority given to the agency to
make the decisions has been determined by the Court.126
V.

POSSIBLE MISCONCEPTIONS

It may be useful at this stage to anticipate some misconceptions

that may occur to one or another of the readers of this article. Ad
ministrative action may take a variety of forms and the distinction
between these forms may seem to provide a convenient basis for de
126. Although this principle has prevailed most of the time, it has not been without
its aberrations. Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.c. § 45
(1982), for example, the Federal Trade Commission is authorized to restrain "unfair
methods of competition." In the first case to reach the Supreme Court interpreting "un
fair method of competition," FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920), the Commission had
ruled that the refusal of a vendor, who held a dominant and controlling position in the
sale of both cotton ties and jute bagging, to sell ties unless the purchaser would agree to
buy a proportionate share of cotton bagging was an unfair method of competition.ld at
424. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission. In its approach, the Court did not
limit itself to a consideration of whether reasonable grounds existed for the Commis
sion's decision. Instead, the Court arrived at its conclusion by way of an independent
judgment of the issue. See id. at 427-29. The conception that the question of what consti
tuted an "unfair method of competition" was an issue upon which an independent judg
ment rested with the Court was repeated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in FTC v.
Motion Pictures Advertising Servo Co., 344 U.S. 392,404 (1953). The determination of
the scope of that term, he said, "has not been left to the administrative agency as part of
its fact-finding authority but is a matter of law to be defined by the Courts." In the end,
however, the Court, recognizing that the agency's very "charter" was to evolve the mean
ing of "unfair methods of competition," retreated to the line that deference should be
paid to the administrative judgment on that subject matter. FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros.,
291 U.S. 304 (1934).
Keppel & Brothers sold penny candies in "break and take" packs, by which children
were induced to buy lesser amounts of concededly inferior candy in the hope of receiving
bonus packs containing extra candy and prizes. Id. at 306-07. The FTC issued a cease
and desist order against the manufacturer on the theory that the marketing scheme con
travened public policy in tempting children to gamble and compelled those who would
successfully compete with Keppel to abandon their scruples by similarly tempting chil
dren.ld. at 307-08. The Court upheld the Commission's determination. While repeating
that it is for the courts to determine what practices or methods of competition are to be
deemed unfair, the Court stated that in passing on that question "the determination of
the Commission is of weight." Id. at 314. The Commission, said Mr. Justice Stone speak
ing for the Court, was created with the purpose of lodging this function in a body spe
cially competent to deal with it, " 'by reason of information, experience and careful study
of the business and economic conditions of the industry affected.''' Mr. Justice Stone
went on to say that the Commission was "organized in such a manner, with respect to the
length and expiration of the terms of office of its members as would 'give to them an
opportunity to acquire the expertness in dealing with those questions concerning industry
that comes from experience.''' Id (quoting SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE COM
MERCE, S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, II (1914».
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termining the appropriate scope of judicial review. These distinc
tions, however, do not provide suitable guidance.
A.

Legislative Rules vs. Interpretive Rules

It may occur to some, for example, that perhaps the answer may lie
in whether the agency is explicitly authorized by statute to define the
statutory term in question. In administrative law, two types of rules
are issued by agencies: "legislative" and "interpretive."127 Legisla
tive rules are those issued pursuant to specific statutory authority
and are said to "have the force and effect of law," whereas interpre
tive rules are merely statements issued by the agency to advise the
public of the agency's construction of a statute, which the court is
free to accept or reject. 128 It might be thought, therefore, that the
courts have been guided by the principle that deference should be
accorded to administrative interpretations issued through "legisla
tive" rules, but not those agency interpretations issued only as so
called "interpretive" rules. That misconception is dispelled, how
ever, by comparing Skidmore v. Sw(ft & Company 129 with Addison v.
Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc. 130
In Skidmore, some employees of a Swift & Company packing
plant brought an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act 13 I
against their employer for overtime. The issue was what constituted
"working time" under the Act. If the employees were engaged in
"working time" they were entitled to overtime pay.I32 In addition to
working a regular day shift, the petitioners agreed to stay in the fire
hall on the company premises three or four nights a week. For each
alarm answered, the employees were paid an agreed amount in addi
tion to their fixed compensation. The company provided sleeping
quarters, a pool table, a domino table, and a radio. The men used
their time as they saw fit except that they were required to be ready
to respond to alarms. 133 The Administrator, given the duty of bring
ing injunction actions to restrain violations, had set forth his views of
127. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,301-02 (1979). See the discussion in 2
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 36-43 (2d ed. 1979) and JAFFE & NATHAN
SON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 470-82 (3d ed. 1968). The Adminis
trative Procedure Act itself draws this distinction. See 5 U.S.c. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1982).
128. Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 30 n.3
(1947).
129. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
130. 322 U.S. 607 (1944).
131. 29 U.S.c. §§ 201-19 (1976).
132. See id. § 207; 323 U.S. at 136.
133. 323 U.S. at 135-36.
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the proper application of the Act under different circumstances in an
interpretive bulletin and in informal rulings. 134 The Court held that
the rulings of the Administrator, while not conclusive or binding on
the Court, were "entitled to respect."
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of
the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experi
ence and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give
it power to persuade, if lacking power to control. 135
In Ho/Iy Hill, a legislative rule was issued by the same Adminis
trator under another provision of the same' act, which provided an
exemption from the Act's overtime requirements for any individual
employed "within the area of production (as defined by the Admin
istrator), engaged in. . .canning of agricultural. . .commodities for
market. . . ."136 The Administrator had defined "area of produc
tion" to include an individual engaged in canning operations if the
cannery obtained its raw materials exclusively from farms in the
neighborhood" 'and the number of employees in such establishment
[did] not exceed seven.' "137
The Court overrode the Administrator's definition. The textual
meaning of "area of production," the Court thought, required con
sideration of varying economic factors. In making his determination,
"the administrator may properly weigh and synthesize the various
economic factors. So long as he does that and no more, judgment
belongs to him and not to the courtS."138 But the Congress did not
leave the decision to the Administrator whether, within the geo
graphic bounds defined by him, the Act further permits discrimina
tion between smaller and bigger establishments. 139 "The
determination of the extent of authority given to a delegated agency
by Congress," said Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "is not left for the deci
Id, at 138.
135, Id, at 140. Quoted with approval in General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
141-42 (1976).
136. 322 U.S. at 608 (quoting Holly Hill Fruit Products v. Addison, 136 F.2d 323,
324 (5th Cir. 1943)).
137. Id. at 609 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 536.2(b) (1938)).
138. Id. at 614.
139. Id. at 613-16.
134,
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sion of him in whom authority is vested."140
So, while in the one case an interpretation contained in a mere
"interpretive" regulation was held by the Court to be "entitled to
respect," in the other case an interpretation contained in a "legisla
tive" regulation, supposedly binding on the Court because issued
pursuant to apparent delegated authority, was not allowed to rest
with the Administrator. It is therefore clear that the distinction be
tween interpretive rules and legislative rules does not determine the
standard of review accorded agency orders. Rather, as with any
other administrative order, the standard of review is defined by the
relationship of the order to the agency's statutory mandate. If within
the agency's bounds of discretion, the court will defer to the agency's
reasonable determination. If the bounds of the agency's discretion is
at issue, however, the court will independently construe the statutory
term.
B.

Rulemaking vs. Adjudication

At one point, the existence of the two lines of cases apparently
in conflict with each other was ascribed to the difference between
rulemaking and adjudication. 141 Rulemaking, since it is said to have
the force and effect of law, would be binding on the court, whereas
adjudications would not. 142 But this does not explain the distinction.
Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,'43 for exam
ple, the Federal Trade Commission is authorized to restrain "unfair
methods of competition" in interstate commerce. Even where the
rules for defining unfair methods of competition come from the pro
cess of adjudication, the determinations of the Commission are to be
given weight. 144 Similarly, although the NLRB is free to conduct its
activities either through rulemaking procedures or by adjudication,
it has elected, with minor exceptions, to proceed by adjudication. '45
Nevertheless, in Hearst, the court's review of the Board's determina
tion that newsboys were "employees" was stated by the Court to be a
limited review. 146 In Holly HI1I, on the other hand, the Court substi
tuted its judgment for the Administrator's interpretation issued in a
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id at 616.
See J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 149-52 (1938).
Id at 151-52.
15 U.S.c. § 45 (1982).
See supra note 126.
R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 15-18 (1976).
Hearst, 322 U.S. at 131-32.
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legislative rule making proceeding. 147 Clearly then, the difference in
treatment cannot be attributed to whether the proceeding is one of
rulemaking or adjudication.
C. Adjudication vs. Enforcement

Judge Learned Hand once intimated that a distinction should
be drawn between interpretations given in adjudications of contested
cases and interpretations of officials charged with the duty of enforc
ing statutes. 148 The position, he reasoned, of a public officer,
charged with the enforcement of a law, is different from one who
must decide a dispute. If there is a fair doubt, "his duty is to present
the case for the side which he represents, and leave decision to the
court...upon which lies the responsibility of decision." 149 Putting
aside the fact that this distinction has not been used to determine the
appropriate scope of review, 150 it seems of questionable validity even
in theory. The consequences of such a distinction would be to create
differing standards for application of the same statute depending
upon the route by which the case reached the court. If by review of
agency adjudication, then the agency's judgment on the question
would be accepted if reasonable, even if contrary to the court's in
terpretation. If, however, the court is reviewing the interpretation of
an official responsible for enforcement, the interpretation would
have to give way to the contrary view of the court. The same statu
tory term might be reviewed under both routes. For example, an
aggrieved person may petition a court of appeals to review a decision
of an agency's adjudication in a contested case, while simultane
ously, the same agency may initiate enforcement action involving the
same issue. Conceivably, the same circuit court of appeals might be
called upon to review the two cases at the same time, but would be
required under Hand's distinction, to employ dissimilar scopes of re
view. The incongruous results likely under this approach make it
unsuitable for determining an appropriate standard of review.
VI.

THE PROPOSED ANALYSIS ApPLIED

What follows is an attempt to apply the analytical framework
outlined herein to some additional sample cases to ascertain if the
147.
148.
aJl'd, 328
149.
150.

See supra text accompanying note 140.
Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 154 F.2d 785, 789-90 (2d Cir.),
U.S. 275 (1946).
Id at 789.
See, e.g, Coca-Cola Boltling, 350 U.S. at 269.
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results can be explained, or better explained, in terms of the sug
gested principle.
The Court, in an early case,151 was required to determine its role
in reviewing the Postmaster General's exclusion of certain sheet mu
sic from second class mail matter as not being a "periodical" under a
statute that provided for reduced rates for such mail. I52 Said the
Court:
[W]e think that, although the question is largely one of law, deter
mined by a comparison of the exhibit with the statute, there is
some discretion left in the Postmaster General. ..and that the ex
ercise of such discretion ought not to be interfered with unless the
court be clearly of opinion that it was wrong. 153

A recent tax case l54 provides additional support for the view
that courts owe deference to agency action taken within the parame
ters of the agency's delegated authority, regardless of the form of the
agency's action. The Internal Revenue Code provides an exemption
from income taxes for "business leagues, chambers of commerce,
real estate boards, boards of trade, or professional football
leagues. . .not organized for profit and no part of the net earnings of
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individ
ual."155 The National Muffler Dealers Association, organized by
Midas Muffler franchisees to establish a group to serve as a bargain
ing agent for its members dealing with Midas, was denied an exemp
tion as a "business league" by the Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue Service. 156 The Court upheld the Commissioner, saying:
The statute's term "business league" has no well-defined
meaning or common usage outside the perimeters of [the Code].
It is a term "so general. ..as to render an interpretive regulation
appropriate.".. .In such a situation, this Court customarily defers
to the regulation which, "if found to implement the Congressional
mandate in some reasonable manner, must be upheld." . . .
We do this because "Congress has delegated to the [agency],
not to the Courts, the task of prescribing 'all needful rules and
regulations for the enforcement' of the Internal Revenue
Code." ... That delegation helps insure that in "this area of lim
itless factual variations," . . . like cases will be treated alike. It
lSI.
152.
153.
154.
ISS.
156.

Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106 (1904).
Act of March 3, 1879, ch. 180, § 7,20 Stat. 355 (1879).
Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 107-08 (1904).
National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
26 U.S.c. § 50 I (c)(6) (1976).
National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 474-75 (1979).
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also helps guarantee that the rules will be written by "masters of
the subject" ....157
It should be noted that a number of cases that are treated by
some commentators l58 as involving a substitution by the Court of its
judgment for that of the administrative judgment are actually cases
in which the Court upheld the interpretation by the agency.159
Where the Court upholds the agency's interpretation, it is difficult to
tell how much weight, if any, the Court gave to the administrative
judgment. Where an agency's interpretation is upheld, only on rare
occasions will the Court indicate the weight accorded the adminis
trative decision. 160 In some of the cases the opinions undeniably
read as expressing an independent view. Nevertheless, since the
Court did in fact confirm the agency's interpretation, the cases do
not render less valid the fundamental premise of this article that
where the boundaries of the agency's discretion have been estab
lished, its exercise of discretion ought not to be interfered with unless
the Court is clearly of the opinion that it was wrong.
It only remains to account for a few cases that, at a hasty glance,
might seem not to be consistent with the analysis suggested here.
One of the cases is Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe. 161
Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act 162 and Section
138 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 163 provide that the Sec
retary of Transportation shall not approve for financing any project
that requires the use of any public parkland unless there is no "feasi
ble and prudent" alternative. l64 The Secretary had authorized the
expenditure of federal funds for the construction of a six-lane inter
state highway through Overton Park in Memphis, Tennessee. The
157. !d. at 476-77 (citation omitted).
158. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 30.06 (1976).
159. See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9,17-18 (1962); FTC
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 553-54 (1960); Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329
U.S. 441, 449 (1947).
160. For one such occasion, see Justice Rutledge'S concurring opinion, in which
Justice Frankfurter joined, in Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441,451 (1947):
I cannot say that the Board's conclusion. . .is wanting either for warrant in law
or for reasonable basis in fact. . . . I think it important, not only for this case
but for like ones which may arise in the future, perhaps as a result of this deci
sion, to make clear that my concurrence in the Court's disposition of the case is
based upon the ground I have set forth, and not upon independent judicial
determination of the question presented on the merits.
161. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
162. 49 U.S.c. § 1653(1) (1976).
163. 23 U.S.c. § 138 (1976).
164. /d.; 49 U.S.c. § 1653(1) (1976).
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petitioners brought suit to halt construction, contending, among
other things, that the Secretary had violated the statute. 165 Although
the Secretary had not issued any regulations defining the term "fea
sible and prudent" or made any factual findings purporting to show
why he believed there was no such alternative to use of the parkland,
the Secretary took the position during the litigation that he had wide
discretion. 166 It was recognized that the requirement that there be no
"feasible" alternative granted "little administrative discretion."
"For this exemption to apply, the Secretary must find that as a mat
ter of sound engineering it would not be feasible to build the high
way along any other route." The Secretary argued, however, that
the requirement that there be no other "prudent" route required him
to engage in a wide-ranging balancing of competing interests. He
contended that the Secretary should weigh the detriment resulting
from the destruction of parkland against the cost of other routes,
safety considerations, and other factors, and determine on the basis
of the importance that he attaches to these other factors whether, on
balance, alternative feasible routes would be "prudent."167
The Court, however, reached the conclusion that no such wideranging balancing was intended.
[T]he very existence of the statutes indicates that protection of
parkland was to be given paramount importance. The few green
havens that are public parks were not to be lost unless there were
truly unusual factors present in a particular case or the cost or
community disruption resulting from alternative routes reached
extraordinary magnitudes. If the statutes are to have any mean
ing, the Secretary cannot approve the destruction of parkland un
less he finds that alternative routes present unique problems. 168

The Court's independent evaluation of the meaning of the stat
ute arguably could be accounted for on anyone of several grounds:
that there had in fact been no prior interpretation of the term by the
administrator but only argument of counsel after the case was in liti
gation; the Court's sensitivity to the environmental issue; or even
perhaps the simple conclusion that the interpretation urged by coun
sel was an unreasonable one. But the argument can also be made
that the Court's approach was dictated by the Court's perception that
this was a significant limitation on the agency's authority. On that
165. 401 U.S. at 405-09.
166. Id. at 409.
167. Id. at 411.
168. Id at 412-13.
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view, this is but another illustration of the principle that the determi
nation of the extent of the authority given to a delegated agency by
the Congress to make the determination is to be decided indepen
dently by the Court. Once the Court has outlined the administra
tor's authority, however, the application of the term within his
authority is left to the administrator.
Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Company 169 is a case on the other
side of the line. In 1959, Congress, in order to protect private utili
ties from further TVA competition, amended the Tennessee Valley
Authority Act I70 to provide that TVA should make no contracts for
the sale or delivery of power outside the "area" for which TVA was
the primary source of power supply on July 1, 1957.171 On that date,
the TVA supplied 62% of the electric power uses in all of Claiborne
County, Tennessee.172 But in the villages of Tazewell and New
Tazewell in Claiborne County, the TVA supplied 6% of the power
and the Kentucky Utilities Company, a private utility company, sup
plied 94%.173 When TVA made plans to supply electricity to the two
villages, Kentucky Utilities instituted an action to enjoin the agency
from supplying power to them, on the ground that the two Tazewells
were outside the area for which the TVA was the primary source of
power on July 1, 1957.174 The Court upheld TVA's determination
that all of Claiborne County was within the area for which TVA was
the principal source of power, stating:
Given the innate and inevitable vagueness of the "area" concept
and the complexity of the factors relevant to decision in this mat
ter, we think it is more efficient, and thus more in line with the
overall purposes of the Act, for the courts to take the TVA's "area"
determinations as their starting points and to set these determina
tions aside only when they lack reasonable support in relation to
the statutory purpose of controlling, but not altogether prohibit
ing, territorial expansion. 175

Viewed from one standpoint, the issue in this case appears to go
to the question of the agency's "authority" to expand its operations,
and under the theory advanced here would seem, therefore, to be
one for the Court's independent decision. Mr. Justice Harlan, in his
169. 390 u.s. I (1968).
170. 16 U .s.c. § 831 (1982).
171. Id § 83In-4(a).
172. 390 u.s. at 3.
173. /d. at 4.
174. Id. at 5.
175. Id at 9.
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dissent, appears to have been thinking along these lines when he ob
served that "an orderly system of law does not place the enforcement
of a restraint upon discretion into the unfettered hands of the party
sought to be restrained . . . ."176 But the agency's discretion in this
case included the discretion to determine the "areas" in which it was
the primary source of power supply.177 The very term "area" is a
broad term which calls for a determination of the geographic bounds
of the areas in which TVA was the primary source of power sup
ply.178 The bounds of these areas could not be defined by Congress
itself, and the text manifests the undoubted purpose of Congress to
delegate authority to the TVA to make the determination. 179 It is un
likely to the point of being inconceivable that Congress intended to
leave such determination to the vagaries of litigation. As the Court
held, therefore, the agency's "area" determinations, provided they
are reasonable, should not be set aside. 180
Certainly, it is reasonable to say that the cases we have been
considering have been guided by the principle suggested herein; it is
hardly possible to say other of Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion in Bar
low v. Collins l81 than that it is inconsistent with that approach. In
that case, a statute l82 authorized a program under which payments
were made to farmers for diverting land from the production of cot
ton. I83 The authorized participants in the program were permitted
to assign their payments to secure cash or advances made to finance
"making a crop."184 The regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture
defined "making a crop" to include assignments to secure "the pay
ment of cash rent for land used for planting, cultivation or harvest
ing." Some of the other advances for which payments might be
assigned were seed, fertilizer, and equipment, as well as food, cloth
ing and other necessities for the producer and his dependents. As
signments could not be made to secure or pay pre-existing debts or
for the purchase price of a farm.18S Petitioners, cash-rent tenant
farmers, filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the reg
176. Id. at 14. Justice Harlan thought there should be a more independent scope of
review. See id. at 13-16.
177. Seeid. at 12-13.
178. See id. at 9-10.
179. See id. at 8-9.
180. Id. at 9.
181. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
182. Food and Agricultural Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-321,79 Stat. 1187 (1965).
183. Id. § 402.
184. 397 U.S. at 160.
185. 7 C.F.R. § 709 (1969).
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ulation permitting them to make assignments to secure the payment
of cash rent was unauthorized. Their complaint alleged that they
were injured because the regulation provided their landlord with the
opportunity to demand that they assign their payments in advance as
a condition to obtaining a lease to work the land. As a result, the
complaint stated, the tenants were required to obtain financing of all
their other farm needs-groceries, clothing, tools and the like-from
the landlord as well, since prior to harvesting the crop they lacked
cash and any source of credit other than the landlord. The landlord,
the complaint alleged, in tum levied such high prices and rates of
interest on these supplies that the tenants' crop profits were con
sumed each year in debt payments. 186
The case was before the Court solely on the issue of whether the
petitioners had standing to challenge the validity of the regulations
in light of the fact that the regulations did not obligate, but merely
permitted, tenant farmers to assign the payments. 18? Consequently,
the Court's decision went only to the standing issue. Nevertheless, in
the course of arriving at the conclusion that the petitioners had
standing to challenge the regulations, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking
for the Court, stated:
The amended regulation here under challenge was promulgated
under 16 U.S.c. § 590d(3) which authorizes the Secretary to "pre
scribe such regulations, as he may deem proper to carry out the
provisions of this chapter." Plainly this provision does not ex
pressly preclude judicial review, nor does any other provi
sion. . . . Nor does the authority to promulgate such regulations
"as he may deem proper" in § 590(d)(3) constitute a commitment
of the task of defining "making a crop" entirely to the discretion
ary judgment of the Executive Branch without the intervention of
the courts. On the contrary, since the only or principal dispute
relates to the meaning of the statutory term, the controversy must
ultimately be resolved, not on the basis of matters within the spe
cial competence of the Secretary, but by judicial application of
canons of statutory construction. 188

Although the standing issue alone was decided, it is clear that Mr.
Justice Douglas conceived the Court's function, if the question of
interpretation should subsequently be brought to the Court, to em
brace the right to determine independently the proper interpretation
186. 397 u.s. at 162-63.
187. Id. at 160 & n.!.
188. 397 U.S. at 165-66.
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of the term "making a crop." 189 This does not appear to be a sound
view of the appropriate spheres for judicial and administrative inter
pretation of such a statutory term.
A decision more congenial to the analysis advocated here arose
in the administration of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. 190
That statute established a program for controlling air pollution. 191
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was required to set
quality standards for the outdoor air used by the general public. 192
Each state, after promulgation of the standards, was required to sub
mit an implementing plan that required approval by the EPA if it
met certain conditions, the main one of which was that the plan pro
vide for the attainment of the standards "as expeditiously as practi
cable" but no later than three years from the date of the plan's
approval. 193 One approach for implementing the standards was that
adopted by Florida, under which the plan's emission limitations
would not take effect until the attainment date. Under this ap
proach, no source was subject to enforcement action during the pre
attainment period, but all were put on notice of the limitations with
which they must eventually comply. Georgia, however, elected to
follow an EPA-endorsed approach under which a State's emission
limitations would be immediately effective, but the State would have
the authority to grant variances to particular sources, a factory for
example, which could not immediately comply with the st~gent
emission limitations necessary to meet the standards. EPA based its
power to allow such variance procedures on its interpretation of Sec
tion 1l0(a)(3) of the Act which provides in pertinent part as follows:
(A) The Administrator shall approve any revision of an imple

mentation plan applicable to an air quality control region if he
determines that it meets the requirement of paragraph (2) and has
been adopted by the State after reasonable notice and public
hearings. 194

EPA took the position that a proposed variance was a "revi
sion" and that a state plan may provide for an individual variance so
long as it does not cause the plan to fail to provide for attainment
and maintenance of the national standards under paragraph (2).
189. The suit was later dismissed in the lower court for failure to prosecute.
190. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970)
(current version at 42 U.S.c. § 7410 (1976 & Supp. V 1981».
191. 42 U.S.c. § 7410.
192. /d. § 7408.
193. Id. § 741O(a)(2)(A).
194. Id. § 741O(a)(3)(A).
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The environmental organizations in the suit argued that the revision
authority of Section 11O(a)(3) was available only for generally appli
cable changes of a state plan, as distinguished from emission limita
tions for an individual source. Variances applicable to individual
sources could be approved, the environmental organizations con
tended, only if they met the procedural and substantive standards
set forth in Section 11O(f), under which its postponements may be for
no more than a year, may be granted only if application was made
prior to the date of required compliance, and must be supported by
the agency's determination that the source's continued operation was
essential to national security or the public health or welfare. 195
The Supreme Court noted that EPA's construction of the statute
had been challenged in a number of circuits. 196 The Courts of Ap
peals for the First, Second and Eighth Circuits rejected the "revi
sion" authority as a basis for a variance procedure but concluded
that authority for the exemption prior to the three-year date for
mandatory attainment of the primary standard nevertheless existed
as a necessary adjunct to the statutory scheme. 197 The Ninth Circuit
concurred in the view that authority for individual variances existed
as a necessary adjunct to the statutory scheme but thought that such
authority existed as well after the attainment date as before. 198 The
Fifth Circuit, the circuit from which the present case arose,however,
agreed with the environmental organizations that the "postpone
ment" provision of Section 11O(t) was the only method by which
individual sources could obtain relief from applicable emission
standards. 199
The Supreme Court stated that,
Without going so far as to hold that the agency's construction of
the Act was the only one it permissibly could have adopted, we
conclude that it was at the very least sufficiently reasonable that it
should have been accepted by the reviewing courtS.2oo
195. 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.c. § 741O(e) (Supp. V 1981».
196. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 72 (1975).
197. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875,887 (1st Cir. 1973);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 494 F.2d 519, 523 (2d Cir. 1974); Natural
Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 483 F.2d 690, 693-94 (8th Cir. 1973).
198. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905, 912-13 (9th Cir.
1974).
199. Natural Resouces Defense Council v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 403 (5th Cir. 1974),
rev'd sub nom., Train v. Natural Resouces Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
200. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975).
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CONCLUSION

The suggestion put forward here is that courts will and should
pay deference to administrative interpretations with respect to issues
falling within the agency's discretion to establish policy but not to
determinations of issues necessary to establish the extent of that dis
cretion. 201 The suggested principle may not mark with precision the
line between those interpretations for which the court will look to the
agency for guidance and those which the court will determine inde
pendently of the agency's view, but it does afford some guide for
judgment. Such a view better explains the decisions and will permit
the most efficient use of court and agency.
Although an independent evaluation by the court of any ques
tion admittedly may give a defeated party additional protection, it is
not necessary for assuring adequate legal control over the agency.
Administrative agencies are distinct institutions and are meant to
have some policy making function. Important as confining agencies
to their business may be, no less fundamental should be an arrange
ment that assures the most efficient and effective use of all of our
institutions.

201. The conclusion that this distinction accounts for the two apparently conflict
ing lines of decisions on the scope of review of administrative interpretations of statutes
is strengthened by the two recent cases of SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978), where the
Court rejected a long-standing interpretation by the SEC of its authority to issue consec
utive 10 day suspension orders on the basis of evidence revealing a single manipulative
scheme, 436 U.S. at 122-23, and CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981), in which the
Court upheld an FCC interpretation of "reasonable access" to broadcasting facilities,
" 'since Congress has confided the problem to the latter,' " 453 U.S. at 394 (quoting FCC
v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946».

